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Abstract
I extend the traditional Diamond Dybvig framework with aggregate liq-
uidity shocks to small open economies. Currency board may imply perfect
risk sharing (with perfect credit markets), contrary to Chang and Velasco
’s …ndings (2000). With interim-date borrowing constraints and …xed ex-
change rates, Wallace’ s (1990) partial suspension of convertibility of de-
posits is obtained. A banking system with an international lender may
implement both allocations without runs. Flexible exchange rates with
local-currency denominated deposits improves risk sharing relative to …xed
exchange rates when borrowing constraints are present. It also avoids equi-
librium bank runs.
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1. Introduction (change)
This paper presents an extension of the traditional Bryant (1981) and Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) framework, embedded in a small open economy with aggre-
gate preference shocks. In a three period economy, each consumer may become
impatient (early consumer) or patient (late consumer). In the model, the number
of impatient consumers in the interim period may be either high or low. As a
benchmark, I …rst check that the socially e¢cient allocation with an (unlimited)
international credit line from an international lender implies perfect risk sharing,
meaning that a non-random and constant per-capita consumption for all agents.
It is also obvious that the availability of international credit always allows the
implementation of the optimal contract by a competitive banking system. This
implementation is free of bank runs given that the international institution also
acts as a lender of last resort with unlimited funds.
Since credit lines in reality are far from being unlimited as in the …rst case,
I introduce borrowing constraints in the social planner’s problem. I assume that
total available international funds are bounded above. In this context it is shown
that the constrained optimal contract implies partial suspension of convertibility
of deposits. An ine¢cient bank run equilibrium reappears, provided that no
extra credit is available for banks with a su¢ciently illiquid long term asset when
facing a panic. However, if an international lender of last resort is able to provide
extra funds at an interest rate which is bounded above by a ratio of long term
to short term deposits, then the run equilibrium disappears. This last result
shows the importance of institutions such as the IMF as a liquidity-based-bank-
run preventing device in borrowing-constrained small open economies. This issue
has been one of the central topics of the discussion about the international …nancial
architecture since the occurrence of the Asian Crisis in 1997.
This paper also adds an interesting analysis on the role of the exchange rate
policy in the stability of the banking system. This work extends the discussion
presented in Chang and Velasco (2000) about how ‡exible exchange rates make
the …nancial system less fragile to the case of aggregate liquidity shocks. This
paper shows that with ‡exible exchange rates it is possible to implement better
allocations than with …xed exchange rates when the banking system is borrowing-
constrained. Hence, …xed exchange rates or even currency boards could only
implement a better allocation when no borrowing constraints are added. The
partial - suspension - of - convertibility result is also replaced by a depreciation
of the nominal exchange rate. Thus, the exchange rate policy is used to manage
aggregate liquidity shocks concerning international currency.
This model allows an alternative interpretation of the rescue packages sent by
international institutions to Argentina during the Mexican Crisis in 1995. The
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theoretical model have interesting implications in terms of policy recommenda-
tions. In the context of the recent crisis in Argentina, one of the most important
points of discussion was the de-dollarization of the …nancial system and a subse-
quent change in the exchange rate regime. This paper shows as a corollary that a
banking system with liabilities in local currency combined with ‡exible exchange
rates is able to o¤er better ex-ante contracts to its depositors than with …xed ex-
change rates. This model predicts then that a depreciation of the local currency
may be the result of an increase in the liquidity needs of the population. In other
words, transitory illiquidity may imply the need of a depreciation or devaluation
of local currency.
Section 2 discusses the literature on bank runs in closed and small open
economies. Section 3 presents the economy. Section 4 analyzed the benchmark
case in which the social planner has unrestricted credit in period 1. Section 5
adds borrowing constraints to the planner’s problem of the economy in section 3.
Section 6 analyzes the case of ‡exible exchange rates. Section 7 discusses some
policy implications. Finally section 8 presents concluding remarks and points of
future research.
2. Related Literature
As mentioned before, the model is built on the Bryant (1980) and Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) tradition 1. The main feature in the current paper is the presence
of two currencies instead of the typical unique type of money in the literature.
However the two papers share with the standard literature the potential existence
of two equilibria, one involving runs.
The two main antecessors are the papers by Chang and Velasco (1998a and
2000). They construct a Bryant - Diamond - Dybvig model in a small open
economy. In the …rst paper (1998b) the long term investment is …nanced partially
by international borrowing (to be paid in the last period). Unlike Chang and
Velasco (2000), in my model both types of consumers (impatient and patient)
derive utility from local (real) currency holdings. The consumption for impatient
agents is …nanced by short term international funds to be paid at the end of the
economy.
Aggregate uncertainty is modelled as in Wallace (1988 and 1990). The amount
of short run withdrawals is stochastic. In the …rst paper Wallace (1988) shows
that the two run-preventing regulatory regimes studied by Diamond and Dybvig
cannot be implemented, due to the non-observability of proportion of impatient
consumers. In the second paper Wallace (1990) presents a special case in which the
1For a survey on the bank runs literature see Freixas and Rochet (1997, chapter 7).
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banking system ’s manager can learn the proportion through the order in which
consumers withdraw in the interim period. He shows that partial suspension of
convertibility in deposit contracts characterizes the planner’s optimal allocation.
I use this special device for the case of two currencies. More recently, Green and
Lin (2000) have shown that with a …nite number of depositors (and then, with
aggregate uncertainty in terms of the proportion of each type of agents) there
is a unique equilibrium involving no runs. However an important assumption in
this work is the fact that depositors know their position in line, which is absent in
Wallace (1990). Actually, Peck and Shell (2001) have recently shown that without
this assumption, runs could be part of the optimal contract.
In terms of the empirical literature that motivates this work, the papers by
Chang and Velasco’s (1998b) and Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini ’s (1998) con-
stitute competing interpretations on the causes of the recent Asian Crisis. The
point of view adopted in this paper is close to what Chang and Velasco (1998b)
call an international - illiquidity - based crisis. In a sense, what constitutes a
crisis in my model can be viewed as a liquidity shock. However, as we see below,
the interpretation of a crisis from the model is twofold. It can be viewed either
as part of the fundamentals or as a self-ful…lling crisis. This discussion is better
developed in section 6.
3. The Economy.
The economy lasts for three periods: t = 0; 1; 2: There are two currencies, called
home currency, or pesos, and foreign currency or dollars. I also use the term
money interchangeably with the term currency. There is only one consumption
good, which is the numeraire. The economy is small and open. Hence the price in
dollars of this good is assumed to be one, identifying then the consumption good
directly with the foreign currency. The two usual technologies in the literature
are assumed here. There is a storage technology that returns one dollar in period
t+ 1 for each dollar invested in period t (with t = 0; 1). On the other hand there
is a long-term investment opportunity. For each unit of the good invested in this
technology at date 0 it returns R > 1 units of the good in period 2, but only
r 2 (0; 1) in period 1:
There is a Lebesgue measure one of ex-ante identical consumers. At the be-
ginning of period 1 each person receives an idiosyncratic preference shock. This
determines whether the consumer survives until period 2 or dies at period 1: The
ex-ante probability of dying in period 1 is ¼. The person who survives until date
1 is called impatient, otherwise she is patient. This probability is stochastic and
unknown ex-ante. In period 0 the proportion of impatient is a random variable.
For simplicity I adopt the device presented by Wallace (1990). Assume that ¼
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can be either p® + (1¡ p) with probability q1 and p® with probability q2: The
complement is the set of patient agents. This is common knowledge. Let s = 1
be the aggregate state in which ¼ = p®+ (1¡ p) and s = 2 be such that ¼ = p®.
In this section I assume that in period 1, state s = 1; all impatient consumers
form a queue in order to get their corresponding consumption allocation. In
particular, assume that, if state s = 1 occurs, then the whole queue containing
the impatient agents can be divided into two groups. Let us call the early group
those who are …rst and the late group to that with agents coming afterwards.
Any person is within the early group with probability p and within the late group
with probability (1¡ p) : In state 2; the group of patient consumers are divided in
two groups. The early group corresponds to the …rst p (1¡ ®) patient consumers
who withdraw a certain amount of pesos at date 1. The late group corresponds
to the second 1 ¡ p patient consumers. Assume that any impatient agent ’s
utility function is u (c1) ; while if she is patient it is
h
u (c2) + v
³
m2
e2
´i
: Here ct
denotes consumption of dollars at date t, m2 is the amount of pesos that a patient
consumer holds between periods 1 and 2, and e2 is the price of the consumption
good in pesos (i.e., the nominal exchange rate). The function u is C2; strictly
increasing and strictly concave. The function v is also C2; strictly concave and it
possesses a unique global maximum, called ¹:
The ex-ante utility function is:
p®u
¡
c11
¢
+ q1
?
(1¡ p)u ¡c21 (1)
¢
+ p (1¡ ®)
?
u
¡
c12 (1)
¢
+ v
µ
m12 (1)
e (1)
¶¸¸
(3.1)
+q2 [p (1¡ ®) + 1¡ p]
??
u (c2 (2)) + v
µ
m2 (2)
e (2)
¶¸¸
where c11 is the amount of dollars that each impatient consumer gets were she …rst
in line (that is, if she is among the …rst p® consumers), c21 (1) is the consumption
of each impatient agent in state 1 if she is among those in the second group (whose
proportion is 1¡ p in this state). Also, c2 (s) denotes the dollar consumption by
each patient agent in state s (period 2) and m2 (s) is the nominal amount of pesos
that each patient consumer holds between periods 1 and 2 at that state. Note
that given the proportion of consumers withdrawing at date 1 the planner learns
the proportion of patient agents before date 2 starts.
Assume that the planner does not observe the aggregate state s at the begin-
ning of date 1. Instead, she must infer that by observing the number of impatient
consumers withdrawing at date 1: If after ®p impatient consumers nobody else
shows up, the planner infers (correctly) that the proportion of impatient people
is ®p and then the state is s = 1: If after those …rst ®p consumers more agents
withdraw at date 1, the proportion of impatient agents must clearly be equal to
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(®p + (1¡ p)) (provided that nobody lies). Hence whenever the planner observes
that there are more impatient consumers than ®p, then she infers that the state
is s = 2: However, in any case, people who were lucky showing up …rst (among
the …rst ®p) should receive the same consumption in period 1 since the planner
cannot know the state at that stage, due to the sequential service constraint. This
explains the fact that c11 is independent of s:
4. Benchmark: The planner’s problem with unlimited funds
at date 1.
Suppose that the planner must borrow from abroad an amount of ¹d units of the
consumption good at date 0. Then she allocates this amount between the short
run technology and the long run asset. Let y be the amount of the good invested in
the short run technology and x the amount invested in the long run asset. At the
beginning of period 1 the preference shock is privately known to each consumer.
As explained before, the planner does not know directly whether the proportion
of impatient agents is high or low. She must learn this through the actual amount
of agents withdrawing at date 1. For now, suppose that the planner is able to
di¤erentiate patient consumers from impatient ones. Impatient consumers are
ordered through a queue. In state 2 all impatient consumers receive the same
amount of consumption c11: In state 1, the …rst p® impatient consumers also get
c11; but the rest of impatient agents gets a (potentially di¤erent) amount c
2
1 (1) ;
since the planner must learn through the queue whether the true state is 1 or 2.
In each case the planner potentially borrows from abroad an additional amount
of z (s) dollars to be repaid at date 2. In this last period, the planner pays o¤ an
amount of cj2 (s) dollars to those patient consumers in state s. This is done after
repaying the total debt, at a gross rate of 1: Assume also that the exchange rate
at all dates is equal to one (this is better explained below).
The problem for the planner is then to maximize (3:1) subject to the con-
straints
x+ y 5 ¹d (4.1)
p®c11 + (1¡ p) c21 (1) 5 y + z (1) (4.2)
p®c11 5 y + z (2) (4.3)
p (1¡ ®) c12 +
¡
¹d + z (1)
¢
5 Rx (4.4)
[p (1¡ ®) + (1¡ p)] c2 (2) +
¡
¹d+ z (2)
¢
5 Rx (4.5)
6
for every t and s: The (su¢cient) …rst order conditions give the following result.
Proposition 4.1. The planner’s solution implies that:
c11 = c
2
1 (1) = c
j
2 (2) = c2 (1)
for j = 1; 2: That is, there is perfect risk sharing at the solution of the planner’s
problem: Moreover the optimal consumption of dollars is equal to
¹c = (R ¡ 1) ¹d
Each patient consumer gets exactly the optimal amount ¹.
Proof. See Appendix.
In this economy clearly perfect capital markets in period 1 are enough to
ensure perfect risk sharing for all agents. The presence of perfect credit markets
at date 1 implies market completeness. This is the underlying argument of the
last proposition, which contrasts clearly with the optimality-of-partial-suspension
result by Wallace (1990). In his article he showed that partial suspension is
optimal in a one - currency economy with …xed endowments. Proposition 4.1
con…rms the fact that Wallace’s result is a consequence of some type of market
incompleteness.
4.1. Implementation of the planner’s solution: the case of a currency
board.
This subsection shows how to implement the optimal allocation considered above
through …nancial institutions. Consider a mutual fund bank owned by all con-
sumers that pools resources and o¤ers peso - denominated contracts to consumers.
There is also a Central Bank that may exchange pesos for dollars. In this sub-
section it is assumed that this institution acts as a currency board. This means
that the Central Bank commits itself to buy and sell dollars for pesos at the …xed
rate of 1: At date 0, the private bank borrows ¹d dollars from abroad and invests
this amount in the long run and the short run asset. The commercial bank issues
demand deposit contracts to consumers, specifying the amount of pesos to be
withdrawn in the corresponding period.
At the beginning of date 1, the state s is realized. Neither the commercial
bank nor the Central Bank observe this realization. All consumers show up at the
private bank to withdraw pesos. Those who claim to be impatients want to get c1
pesos, while those who claim to be patient want ¹ pesos (to be stored until date 2).
The commercial bank would learn s through the amount of consumers who claim
their type. Starting date 1, the bank knows for sue that at least a proportion
7
p® of the population is impatient and a proportion of at least p (1¡ ®) agents
are patient. However, bankers do not know at that time whether the remaining
proportion of 1¡p consumers is of an impatient or of a patient type. Hence, banks
pay a certain amount of c11 pesos to the …rst p® consumers claiming impatience
and a certain amount of m12 pesos to the …rst p (1¡ ®) agents claiming patience.
These amounts are independent of the state s; since they pay this before banks
learn whether the remaining 1¡ p agents are patient or impatient. Let c21 (1) be
the amount of pesos that impatient consumers within this second group receive in
period 1, state 1. Let m22 (2) be the amount of pesos that late patient consumers
receive in period 1; state 2:
At the beginning of date 1 the commercial bank may borrow from abroad (from
an international lender) an amount to satisfy exactly the pesos to be withdrawn by
impatient agents. Although there are several ways to assume sequential service
constraints here, for simplicity I adopt the following sequence of actions. The
commercial bank …rst may borrow dollars from abroad, which are completely sold
to the Central Bank in exchange for an equal amount of pesos (the exchange rate
is assumed to be equal to one). Each consumer withdraws pesos from banks. Then
impatient agents sell those pesos for dollars at the Central Bank (at an exchange
rate equal to one). Impatient consumers consume dollars and disappear. Patient
consumers store the pesos until date 2. After this, the Central Bank returns the
unused amount of dollars to the commercial banks in exchange for unused pesos,
and these banks return the unused amount of dollars to the foreign lender.
At the beginning of date 2 commercial banks must repay their outstanding
foreign debt using a portion of the receipts from the long run investments. Af-
ter repaying foreign debt, the remaining dollars are sold to the Central Bank in
exchange for pesos (also at an exchange rate of one). Then the …nancial inter-
mediary pay pesos to the patient consumers. These pesos are then sold to the
Central Bank. Finally, agents consume the dollars sold by the Central Bank and
the economy disappears.
The commercial bank then maximizes
p®u
¡
c11
¢
+ q1
£
(1¡ p)u ¡c21 (1)
¢
+ p (1¡ ®) ¡u ¡c12 (1)
¢
+ v
¡
m12
¢¢¤
(4.6)
+q2
£
p (1¡ ®) ¡u ¡c12 (2)
¢
+ v
¡
m12
¢¢
+ (1¡ p) ¡u ¡c22 (2)
¢
+ v
¡
m22 (2)
¢¢¤
subject to the constraints (4.1) and
p®c11 + p (1¡ ®)m12 + (1¡ p) c21 (1) 5 z (1) + y
p®c11 + p (1¡ ®)m12 + (1¡ p)m22 (2) 5 z (2) + y
p (1¡ ®) c12 (1) 5 p (1¡ ®)m12 +Rx¡ ¹d¡ z (1)
p (1¡ ®) c12 (2) + (1¡ p) c22 (2) 5 p (1¡ ®)m12 + (1¡ p)m22 (2)
+Rx¡ ¹d¡ z (2)
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and the incentive compatibility constraint:
max
©
u
¡
c11
¢
; u
¡
c21 (1)
¢ª
5 max
s
[u (c2 (s)) + v (m2 (s))]
It is not di¢cult to show the conditions under which the planner’s allocation
presented above can be implemented in this currency board regime. The following
proposition shows when this is possible.
Proposition 4.2. With unlimited credit in period 1 the planner’s solution can
be implemented in a decentralized banking system equilibrium with a currency
board.
The proof of this result is in the appendix. The intuition is immediate. Under
these assumptions it is straightforward to show that banks will not invest in the
liquid asset, since they have an unlimited credit line at date 1. Since at the
beginning of this period commercial banks do not know the state s; they borrow a
total of ¹c+ ¹ dollars coming from abroad. Banks sell these dollars to the Central
Bank in exchange for pesos. All impatient consumers withdraw exactly ¹c pesos at
commercial banks, which are immediately sold to the Central Bank to obtain and
consume ¹c dollars. All patient consumers withdraw ¹ pesos to be held until period
2. At the end of period 1, banks resell (1¡ ¼ (s)) ¹c + ¼ (s)¹ pesos to the Central
Bank at an exchange rate of one to get the corresponding amount of dollars to
be repaid to the foreign lenders before ending t = 1. At the beginning of period
2, commercial banks obtain the output from the long term investment to repay
the remaining external debt. To do this, patient consumers return their ¹ pesos
withdrawn at date 1 to the commercial banks, which are sold to the Central Bank
at an exchange rate of one. Commercial banks are able to pay ¹c pesos to the each
patient consumer, who …nally sell them to the monetary authority, so that each
patient consumer can also get ¹c dollars.
4.2. No-runs with in…nitely available credit with unit gross rate.
This subsection brie‡y addresses the question of bank runs within the framework
above. Assume that an international institution commits to lend (at zero net
interest rates) any amount of dollars above z (1) : The next result shows that this
commitment is enough to eliminate the run equilibrium in both exchange rate
systems.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that the international lender lends any amount of
dollars to the banking system at zero net interest rates. Hence the run equilibrium
is eliminated under a currency board.
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The proof is immediate and omitted. The intuition is standard. The fact that
R > 1 implies that the long term investment is always able to honor all debt,
including deposits withdrawn by patient consumers who withdraw early. Hence
no bank can fail (in the …xed exchange rate regime, the Central Bank always
have enough dollars to be sold in exchange for pesos). Since the equilibrium
consumption allocation of dollars satis…es the incentive compatibility constraint
then all patient consumers prefer to wait (in the absence of bank failure). Thus
the international lender of last resort acts as a coordinating device that ensures
that the unique equilibrium is the one without runs.
5. The planner’s problem with borrowing constraints.
The last section presents an economy with perfect international credit markets.
This clearly contradicts evidence. This is seriously a problem since most of the
recent crises were somehow caused by borrowing constraints. This section adds
restrictions in the borrowing of the social planner (or the commercial banks in
the banking system) in period 1. These constraints are somehow justi…ed by
the way institutions such as the IMF lend in practice to developing countries.
In particular, o¢cial documents from the IMF (2000) con…rm that members face
quotas of credit funding, based on the member ’s relative size. These quotas make
plausible that even a potential planner may face credit constraints that impedes
perfect risk sharing. I then extend the analysis above considering a constrained
optimum problem.
More formally, assume that the social planner maximizes (3:1) subject to the
constraints (4:2), (4:4), (4:5) and the following equations.
x+ y 5 d (5.1)
d+ z (s) 5 ¹d; s = 1; 2 (5.2)
where now d is the decision variable and ¹d denotes now the (exogenous) total
credit availability at date 1: Here it is assumed that the planner does not observe
s at the beginning of period 1. Instead the impatient consumers form a line in
front of the pay-o¤ window of the planner, and this learns whether s is 1 or 2
through the amount of impatient agents who show up at date 1. In particular, if
the planner only ends up receiving ®p agents in period 1, then she interprets that
s = 1: If however after paying to ®p agents there is at least an extra consumer
showing up for payment, then she learns that s = 2: The probability that, in state
1; each consumer is included in the …rst ®p agents is equal to p: In this case, for
every impatient agent who shows up in period 1 for payment the planner may
borrow a certain amount of dollars from the international lender to pay o¤ the
10
consumer. Hence the international lender also learns the state s exactly as the
social planner does. Relaxations of this assumption seem important but it involves
more complicated issues on contract design. This is left for future research.
5.1. Characterization of the constrained optimum.
Due to the borrowing restrictions at date 1, the optimal consumption allocation
under these constraints may not be deterministic as in the unrestricted credit
case. In particular, it is possible that the consumption allocation of dollars may
not be the same for the impatient consumers who are paid …rst and those who
are paid secondly. The next proposition shows that …rst - in - line depositors get
a higher level of consumption than the those in the second group.
Proposition 5.1. The constrained optimal allocation implies that c11 > c
2
1 (1).
In this allocation all patient agents consume the satiation level of pesos, ¹:
The proof is presented in the appendix. Hence, partial suspension of convert-
ibility (in the sense of Wallace, 1990) reappears here, even though limited credit
markets are available for the planner in the …rst two periods. This proposition
implies that it is enough to impose an exogenous constraint to the planner (bor-
rower) involving periods 0 and 1 loans to generate this result. In a sense, a binding
borrowing constraint is associated with high liquidity needs in the economy. In
this situation, the proposition would predict that banks will partially suspend the
convertibility of certi…cates of deposit in an event of aggregate illiquidity; which
is signaled by facing binding borrowing constraints, although this does not imply
any intrinsic problem in the …nancial system. In other words, partial suspension
is also part of the constrained optimal allocation.
In the proof of the last proposition it is shown that impatient agents’s con-
sumption can be …nanced in di¤erent ways. However, it is characterized by strictly
positive borrowing in period 1, state 1, and also strictly positive investment in
the short run asset and/or strictly positive borrowing at date 1, state 2. Hence
it can be assumed without loss of generality that the consumption of the …rst ®p
consumers is entirely …nanced by the liquid investment and, in state 1, the rest
of payments is …nanced through borrowing.
5.2. Implementation of the constrained e¢cient allocation
This subsection explores the relationship between the implementation of second-
best allocation and the exchange rate regime within a similar banking system to
the one presented in section 4. Consider …rst the banking system in subsection
4.1. As above, banks borrow from a (private) international lender an amount d
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of dollars and they invest it in both the liquid and the illiquid asset. The idea
is that commercial banks (as de…ned before) face the borrowing constraint (5:2)
at date 1. Therefore …nancial intermediaries can only borrow up to ¹d dollars in
total. The rest of actions are as in subsection 4.1.
The question is whether a currency board implements this. The shows that
this cannot happen:
Proposition 5.2. Under a currency board with limited credit as assumed above,
the second best allocation cannot be implemented as an equilibrium of a banking
system similar to that of section 4.2.
The formal proof is in the appendix. The main problem is that within this
exchange rate system, the amount of pesos withdrawn by the early patient con-
sumers in period 1 (the …rst p (1¡ ®) agents) is strictly less than ¹:
Therefore, a local lender of last resort, providing transitory liquidity in pesos
for at least a group of impatient agents, may be needed to implement the second
best allocation. Consider the following timing of actions. Actions at date 0 are
identical to the system described above in this section. In period 1, each com-
mercial bank sells dollars coming from either liquid investments or from foreign
debt borrowed at that date to the Central Bank at a one-to-one rate. In addition,
the Central Bank lend ¹ pesos (per-capita) to the commercial banks. These in-
stitutions pay the corresponding amount of pesos to each consumer (the amount
is the one speci…ed in the second best allocation). Patient consumers store the ¹
pesos until date 2. Impatient consumers sell their pesos to the Central Bank at
a one - to - one rate. The commercial bank return the unused borrowed pesos to
the Central Bank at the end of this period.
In period 2 the commercial banks liquidate their long term investment. They
…rst pay their foreign debt. The remaining is sold to the Central Bank. At the
same time, patient consumers return their ¹ pesos to commercial banks, which
at the same time return them to the monetary authority. The commercial banks
give c2 (s) pesos to each patient consumer (these pesos are those obtained from
selling dollars to the Central Bank). The patient agent sells these pesos to the
Central Bank, always at a one-to-one exchange rate.
This system is able to implement the second best allocation, as expressed in
the following proposition:
Proposition 5.3. Implementation of the constrained optimum can be done within
a …xed exchange rate regime with a local lender of last resort.
The proof is in the appendix. The logic of the argument is that all the con-
sumption of pesos by patient consumers are completely …nanced by pesos issued
by the Central Bank and lent to commercial banks.
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5.3. Bank Runs and Lenders of Last Resort
With credit constraints, it is natural to re-think how ine¢cient bank runs arise in
equilibrium. Clearly, as it is the case in the literature the conditions for which bank
runs constitute another equilibrium is linked to the return of early liquidation of
the long run asset, r; as well as to the consumption allocation at the constrained
optimum. (The proof is found in the appendix).
Proposition 5.4. Assume that
r < R
µ
c21 (1)
c2 (1)
¶
Then the contract that implements the constrained optimum is subject to runs.
Hence, there is an equilibrium in which the Central Bank fail in period 1. Other-
wise no failure takes place.
This is an extension of the result by Chang and Velasco (2000). Suppose that
the inequality above holds. In a run, the commercial banks need to liquidate
early all of the long term investment. Recall that if more than a proportion of
®p consumers withdraw at date 1 then …nancial intermediaries and the Central
Bank infer that the true state is s = 1: But then each consumer should get c21 (1) :
However the inequality implies that total date-1 assets are less than total dollars
demanded in period 1, implying the failure of either the intermediary (in the
currency board regime) or the monetary authority (in the …xed exchange rate
regime, due to its role as local lender in pesos).
Thus, it is clear that the existence of an international lender of last resort
constitutes a run-preventing device. Suppose that this international institution
provides liquidity in dollars in period 1 above the debt constraint imposed by the
private international institution, ¹d dollars. Then, it is easy to show the following
result (the proof is in the appendix).
Proposition 5.5. Assume that an international lender of last resort is able to
lend any amount whenever a threat of panic arises in the banking system. Then,
as long as the gross interest rate is less than or equal to c2 (1) = c21 (1) the run
equilibrium is eliminated.
The main conclusion is that this international lending institution eliminates
the run equilibrium allowing for implementation of the second best allocation
without panics, as long as the interest rate charged by the international lender is
not too high. Therefore the international lender of last resort is always su¢cient
to prevent liquidity-based bank runs in a two-currency economy, where the local
currency is used only intra-period.
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5.4. An example: linear quadratic case
To illustrate these conditions I present a numerical example based on linear
quadratic utility functions. Assume that
u (c) = ¡°
2
c2 + ¯c+ ±
where all coe¢cients are strictly positive and ¯ > R ¹d: This is so to assume that,
on the relevant domain, u0 (c) > 0. Assume also that
v (m) = ¡1
2
m2 + ¼m+ º
Then:
¹ = ¼
Given the utility function u above we have that the …rst order conditions can
be reduced to the following linear system.
c11 ¡ q1c21 (1)¡ q2c2 (2) = 0
¡°c11 + °Rq1c2 (1) + °Rq2c2 (2) = ¯ (R ¡ 1)
R®pc11 +R (1¡ p) c21 (1) + p (1¡ ®) c2 (1) = (R¡ 1) ¹d
R®pc11 + (R ¡ 1) (1¡ p) c21 (1) + (p (1¡ ®) + 1¡ p) c2 (2) = (R¡ 1) ¹d
which can be written in the following way
2
664
1 ¡q1 0 ¡q2
¡° 0 °Rq1 °Rq1
R®p R (1¡ p) p (1¡ ®) 0
R®p (R¡ 1) (1¡ p) 0 (p (1¡ ®) + 1¡ p)
3
775
2
664
c11
c21 (1)
c2 (1)
c2 (2)
3
775 =
2
664
0
¯ (R¡ 1)
¹d (R ¡ 1)
¹d (R ¡ 1)
3
775
The proof of this is directly derived from the …rst order conditions and left to
the reader. As the explicit solution does not give a specially intuitive condition, I
prefer to report the solutions to these problems for numerical examples. Assume
the following values for the parameters.
p ® q1 R ¯ °
0:25 0:20 0:5 1:5 10 1
The following table shows the second best allocations for three values of ¹d:
allocationnvalue of ¹d 4 5 6
c11 1:1742 1:5419 1:9097
c21 (1) 0:5548 0:9484 1:3419
c2 (1) 6:4387 6:5871 6:7355
c2 (2) 1:7935 2:1355 2:4774
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As it is clear, a softening in the foreign borrowing constraint (i.e., an increase in
¹d) decreases the percentage of the partial suspension for impatient agents. For
example, when ¹d = 4; the variable c21 (1) represents 47.2% of c
1
1; while when ¹d =
4 it represents 70.26%.
The next table shows gives the upper bound for r so that illiquidity is veri…ed.
It also has upper bounds for the interest rate charged by an international lender
of last resort in order to prevent runs.
variablesnvalue of ¹d 4 5 6
r 0:1292 0:2159 0:2988
int. rate 11:605 6:9455 5:0194
Note that the maximum interest rate that can be charged by the international
lender of last resort seems to decrease in ¹d: A possible interpretation states that,
as the availability of credit in the second best problem increases, the disparity
between consumption assigned to (second group) impatient agents and the patient
consumers at date 2 decreases. But the upper bound of the interest rate on the
credit line provided by the international liquidity provider is lower the closer are
these two consumption values. Basically, the greater ¹d; the more generous is the
payment to the impatient consumers in period 1 and the greater is the need of
credit in this same period to prevent panics. Hence the interest rate must be less
tight to implement this procedure.
6. Constrained optimum and Flexible Exchange Rates
In the last section, implementation of the constrained optimal allocation implies
that, when ¹ > c21 (1) ; impatient agents who withdrew pesos must return them
to the Chang and Velasco (2000) demonstrated that, in the absence of aggregate
uncertainty, a f lexible exchange rate regime is able to implement the optimal
allocation without runs. This policy can be interpreted in fact as a threat of
devaluation, since in their equilibrium the exchange rate remains …xed at 1. Hence,
their model does not generate any equilibrium exchange rate depreciation. The
model presented in last section can be adapted so that the implementation of a
constrained optimum implies exchange rate devaluations.
Suppose an economy as in section 5. Consider the planner problem …rst.
Assume now that the planner can observe the aggregate state s at the beginning
of period 1. In this case, there is clearly only one consumption variable for that
state. That is, c1 (s) denotes consumption of dollars for the agent given that she
is impatient in period 1 and given the state s: Hence, ex-ante preferences are now
de…ned as follows.
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q1
?
(p® + 1¡ p)u (c1 (1)) + p (1¡ ®)
µ
u (c2 (1)) + v
µ
m2 (1)
e (1)
¶¶¸
(6.1)
+q2
?
p®u (c1 (2)) + (p (1¡ ®) + 1¡ p)
µ
u (c2 (2)) + v
µ
m2 (2)
e (2)
¶¶¸
where ct (s) denotes the consumption of dollars by the agent at date t = 1; 2,
aggregate state s, andmt (s) denotes the amount of pesos consumed at date t; state
s: The problem for the planner now is to maximize this utility function subject
to the same constraints as the planner in section 5 (I maintain the borrowing
constraint). It is clear that the following proposition must be true (The proof is
in the appendix).
Proposition 6.1. The solution to the planner ’s problem in the case of a pub-
licly observed aggregate state s is incentive - compatible for each consumer and
implies a higher ex-ante expected utility relative to that with the informational
restrictions.
Therefore, this allocation is Pareto - improving relative to that studied in last
section. It is still less preferable than the one in section 4, given that c1 (1) <
c1 (2) at the solution. That is, optimal consumption at date 1 is stochastic.
6.1. Implementation: Flexible (Contingent) Exchange Rate Policy
This subsection embeds the same banking system described in section 5 into a
‡exible exchange rate regime. This exchange rate policy is similar to that used
in Chang and Velasco (2000). Consider the banking system analyzed in section
5. This means that commercial banks cannot directly learn the realization of
s at the beginning of date 1: Note that with …xed exchange rates, commercial
banks cannot implement the allocation in the last subsection, since the optimal
allocation implies no di¤erence in consumption for all impatient agents in state
s. However, a similar banking system can work here if coped with a flexible
exchange rate.
Consider the following …nancial system. Each commercial bank borrows d
dollars from abroad at date 0 and invests in both the illiquid long term and the
liquid short term assets. Each consumer has the right to withdraw ¹ pesos in
period 1, in any state and c2 (s) at date 2; state s: At the beginning of date 1,
the realization of s is not observed by anyone in the economy. The realization
of types are observed only by each individual consumer. Then the Central Bank
issues (p®+ 1¡ p) ¹ pesos to the commercial banks. Each commercial bank pays
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¹ pesos to the impatient consumers withdrawing in the interim period. If the
aggregate state is s = 2; then the commercial bank pays returns to the Central
Bank a total of (1¡ p)¹ pesos after honoring the deposits of the p® impatient
consumers. They immediately try to sell ¹ pesos at the Central Bank in exchange
for dollars. Following Chang and Velasco (2000), I assume that there is no se-
quential service constraint at the Central Bank when selling dollars for pesos in
period 1. Instead, there is an auction to sell those dollars. But then the Central
Bank learns immediately the realization of s since it observes the size of consumers
selling pesos for dollars. Therefore the banking authority …xes the exchange rate
between pesos and dollars in the following way
e1 (s) ´ ¹
c1 (s)
(6.2)
This implies that each impatient consumer gets exactly c1 (s) dollars to con-
sume at date 1. Finally, at the beginning of period 2, the Central Bank issues
(1¡ ¼ (s)) c2 (s) pesos, where ¼ (s) is the proportion of impatient consumers at
state s. These pesos are delivered to the commercial banks. Each private bank
receives (1¡ ¼ (s))¹ pesos from the patient consumers, to be returned to the Cen-
tral Bank. The private bank also pays o¤ c2 (s) pesos to each patient consumer.
After this, the private bank gets the revenue from the long term asset, returns
foreign debt dollars and deliver the remaining dollars and the returned pesos to
the Central Bank. Then, each consumer sells the c2 (s) pesos to the Central Bank
at an exchange rate equal to one. It can be easily seen that each patient agent
gets c2 (s) dollars to be consumed at the end of period 2. Therefore, this …nancial
system implements the optimal allocation. The next proposition summarizes this
result.
Proposition 6.2. A banking system as described in section 5 can implement
the optimal allocation if the Central Bank …xes the period 1 exchange rate as in
equation 6.2 with a unit exchange rate in period 2.
Thus, exchange rates do depend on the state and time. In other words, the
exchange rate policy that implements the optimal allocation is contingent. The
important point is that, even with foreign credit restrictions and lack of informa-
tion about the realization of the aggregate shock, this banking system is able to
implement a better allocation than that of section 5. However, it seems that a
‡exible exchange rate is important for this implementation to occur.
6.2. Exchange Rate Policy as a Bank-Run Preventing Device
Chang and Velasco (2000) showed that a similar exchange rate policy prevents
bank runs. In this paper, the same conclusion can be easily obtained after some
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adaptations of that same result.
Proposition 6.3. There exists a contingent (perfectly credible) exchange rate
policy such that the unique equilibrium corresponds to the optimal allocation.
Hence bank runs cannot occur in equilibrium.
Proof. To show this, I extend the depreciation policy to the case of runs. The
Central Bank issues at the beginning of date 1 …rst an amount of (p®+ 1¡ p)¹
pesos to be delivered to commercial banks. Suppose that s = 1: If, more than
p® + 1¡ p people (say, a proportion [(p®+ 1¡ p) + p (1¡ ®) ¡ ¼]) try to sell ¹
pesos in the auction, the Central Bank sets simply the exchange rate equal to
be1 (1) ´ [(p®+ 1¡ p) + p (1¡ ®)¡ ¼]¹
(p®+ 1¡ p) c1 (1)
Each consumer gets in period 1 a total of (p®+1¡p)
[(p®+1¡p)+p(1¡®)¡¼]c1 (1) dollars, which is
clearly less than c1 (1) : Note that the Central Bank does not su¤er any problem
since the total amount of dollars to pay here is equal to (p®+ 1¡ p) c1 (1) : Since
the optimal allocation implies that c2 (s) ¸ c1 (1) ; then by waiting until date 2
every patient person gets strictly more than by running: Therefore no patient
consumer will …nd optimal to withdraw at date 1.
Suppose that the true state is s = 2: Suppose that the proportion of consumers
selling pesos in period 1 to the Central Bank is strictly greater than p®. Let p®+´
denote the actual proportion of agents withdrawing ¹ pesos in period 1. Banks
wrongly perceive that the state is s = 1; so commercial banks borrow according
to what the allocation dictates to borrow in state 1. In this case, then the Central
Bank sets the exchange rate equal to
be1 (2) ´ [p®+ ´]¹
(p® + ´) c1 (1)
=
¹
c1 (1)
Thus, each consumer selling pesos at date 1 gets c1 (1) dollars, which is (weakly)
dominated by c2 (s) : Hence, no patient consumer chooses to withdraw at date 1 in
state 2: This shows that the optimal allocation constitutes the unique equilibrium.
Note that the argument uses the fact that the exchange rate policy will be
applied in period 1 with certainty. If the Central Bank cannot commit to this
policy ex-ante, then the same argument may fail, depending upon the incentives
to deviate by the monetary authority. This is specially true if the depreciation of
the peso is not interpreted as the outcome of an auction but as a direct devaluation
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policy. Kawamura (2001) shows that, in absence of aggregate uncertainty, the
devaluation threat introduced by Chang and Velasco (2000) may not be credible,
in the sense that a benevolent Central Bank may want to deviate from that policy.
However the same result has not been extended to the aggregate uncertainty case.
7. Empirical and Policy Implications
The results in this paper sheds some light on the discussion about contingent
credit lines for …nancial systems. Propositions 4.1 and 5.1 state that international
institutions may provide funds with high liquidity needs in the short run, so that
withdrawals do not have to be suspended. This allows for an alternative interpre-
tation of the banking distress observed in Argentina, in 1995, after the Mexican
crisis. The model suggests that the help from the International Monetary Fund,
the Inter American Development Bank and the World Bank was mainly directed
to provide funds due to a fundamental liquidity shock faced by the banking system
of this country (besides the banking system restructuring process, see Camdessus,
1995). It is interesting to compare this view to the traditional self-ful…lling run
interpretation of such a crisis. The banking problem in Argentina in 1995 may be
viewed as a high realization of the liquidity shock. This interpretation seems to
be more consistent with the model presented here than with the usual (ine¢cient)
equilibrium interpretation. As Chang and Velasco (1998a) and others have shown,
in a traditional Diamond - Dybvig model without aggregate uncertainty a lender
of last resort always prevents runs. Hence runs cannot occur in these equilibria.
This is inconsistent with the evidence. Proposition 5.1 specially implies that, in
state 1 (when the proportion of impatient consumers is high) banks must reduce
payments at some point. It also implies that the borrowing constraint is bind-
ing. This can be interpreted as a situation in which the government negotiates
an increase in loans (which is not necessary with lower liquidity needs). This
negotiation actually happened in 1995 (see the document IMF News, 1995). The
actual increase in Disbursements from 1994 to 1995 to Argentina was larger than
2.5 times (from 611.95 millions of ADR’s to 1,558.966 millions).
On the other hand, proposition 5.3 states that a suitable local lender of last
resort is needed to implement the optimal allocation. In a sense this result suggests
that both the international and the local lender could complement each other.
However such a local lender cannot have a loose behavior. The main risk of
such a situation is to decrease the foreign reserves stock when facing too many
customers with local currency holdings selling them to the Central Bank. Thus the
purpose of the local lender must be limited only to cover local currency liquidity
needs. In a di¤erent model, Antinol…, Huybens and Keister (2001) emphasize the
need of restrictions imposed on the local lender. In particular, they show that a
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costless local lender (as it is in my model) implies a continuum of hyperin‡ationary
equilibria. This clearly calls for either high interest rates or for upper bounds on
local currency supply to rule this situation out.
It is worth emphasizing that this paper does not try to answer general questions
on social optimality of a currency board compared to other exchange rate regimes.
The scope of this work is more modest. However this paper predicts that, for
economies with low level of demand for local currencies, a currency board is
consistent with full insurance against liquidity shocks. As long as either the
return on long term investments is high enough (and certain) or the availability of
credit in dollars is high enough, then a currency board is able to provide perfect
risk sharing to the customers of a banking system with simple peso-denominated
deposit contracts. More in general this implies that countries with a very low
relative demand for local currency (relative to foreign currency) may be more
propense to use currency boards. Unfortunately I have found no evidence on this
issue yet. However this prediction can be contrasted using indirect indicators
such as foreign - currency - denominated deposit contracts. A more direct way
to contrast the prediction is to look at the units of account used in several main
transactions. Casual evidence in Argentina suggests that most important types
of transactions (such as real estate and durables) are made using the American
dollar as the unit of account. I leave this problem for future research.
The analysis in section 6 implies that, when foreign credit restrictions are
binding, then the optimal allocation may call for ‡exible exchange rates. This
statement must be quali…ed. Results in last section only refer to the virtues of
‡exibility of exchange rates in terms of absorbing liquidity shocks. However, there
is a well-known large body of literature about the credibility issues that ‡exible
exchange rates with loose …scal behavior imply in emerging economies. In a sense,
section 6 is not intended to defend ‡exible exchange rates per-se. On the contrary,
it con…rms the necessity of rules (although these are contingent) and commitment
to make the policy credible (recall that the exchange rate policy in section 6 is
credible due to perfect commitment by the Central Bank).
This analysis also seems helpful to re‡ect on recent views about the recent
Argentine crisis. Several policy suggestions were given as a way out of the cur-
rency board regime. Among others, perhaps the Haussman’s proposal (2001) was
the best known not only in the academic area, but also was certainly partially
applied in the real situation. In any case, Haussman proposed a de-dollarization
of liabilities in Argentina as an essential pre-requisite to ‡oating exchange rates.
In terms of the model in section 6, this proposal seems to make sense for banks
with dollar - denominated assets (under the caveats discussed in the paragraph
above). The model predicts that ‡exible rates with peso - denominated bank li-
abilities implies a better insurance against aggregate liquidity shocks than either
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a …xed exchange rate, a currency board or even a dollarized2 banking system.
However, the model is silent about the e¢cacy of such policies with banks with
peso-denominated assets. Since in the current situation most of these assets are
also denominated in local currency, the model needs to be modi…ed to address the
in‡uence of exchange rate ‡oating on the banking system performance.
On the other hand, as long as the funds from a foreign credit line given by an
international lender of last resort are used to cover transitory illiquidity, then
proposition 5.4 speci…es that these credit lines, regardless of the exchange rate
regime, always prevents runs. Also, proposition 5.4 suggests upper bounds for
the interest rate that the international lender of last resort must charge in order
to make repayment feasible. Once more the main problem here is to measure
deposits with di¤erent horizons so that interest rates on these credit lines still
allow its preventing role. I do not suggest to take these ratios literally, but they
constitute a major guide for interest rate negotiations.
From the paragraphs above it is clear that implementing such institutions is
not easy. Monitoring costs (in the sense of keeping track of deposits) and the
problem of measuring the liquidity needs in each currency are di¢cult. This
does not mean that they are infeasible in practice, but the implicit informational
assumptions give a warning in terms of how to implement them. In any case all
these regulatory regimes implied by the results deal with liquidity problems. It
does not say anything in terms of solvency issues. The main challenge in practice is
to discover whether certain …nancial distress phenomena were caused by liquidity
or solvency problems. This still remains an open question for the policy makers.
8. Concluding remarks and possible extensions
This paper has presented an extension of the Diamond - Dyvbig framework to
a banking system with two currencies. It was also assumed that the proportion
of impatient consumers is unknown (ex-ante). The …rst point is that a banking
system within a currency board regime implements a …rst best allocation as an
equilibrium only when perfect credit markets are available. Otherwise, a local
lender of last resort is needed to implement the optimal allocation.
This model is also able to predict a reduction in deposit payments when the
liquidity shock is high. The model also predicts a binding borrowing constraint.
These two features resembles events in which local banking systems received funds
from international institutions when facing some situation of distress. The model
also emphasizes the importance of the interest rate level on those funds. These
cannot be too high so that repayment is ensured. The upper bound is related
2The dollarization case was not discussed since it is a trivial extension of Wallace ’s (1990)
work.
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to the ratio of long term over short term deposits. This has implications on the
design process of contingent credit lines.
A possible direction for future work is the construction of a version of this
model in a world integrated economy with two tradable currencies, following also
similar ideas as in Allen and Gale (2000). There are several issues that can be
addressed with this framework. Perhaps one of the most discussed issues is the
incentive to constitute the reserves for the international lender of last resort. In the
paper I have presented such problem could not be studied since the economy was
of the small open type. A world integrated economy with well-de…ned participants
could help to see when each country is willing to deposit funds in an international
institution.
Another important point to be addressed is the role of non-tradeables. In
this model, only the patient consumers derive utility from pesos. However this
is clearly arti…cial, as it is discussed in Chang and Velasco (2000). The intuition
that pesos are used for local transactions (specially, for transactions in non -
tradeables) must be transformed into a model that incorporates explicitly non
tradeables. The model by Chang and Velasco (1999) can be extended to address
this problem.
More fundamental shocks can be introduced, making either the short term
rate (as in Chang and Velasco, 2001) or the long investment return (as in Allen
and Gale, 1998) stochastic. This would allow to study solvency - based runs
and the role of the lenders of last resort to prevent such runs, if these are not
optimal. Nevertheless, problems of asymmetric information could make things
worse. The reason is that, when returns are risky, adverse selection may not
allow for availability of an international lender of last resort. This issue should be
studied in combination with a world-integrated environment.
A related topic to the solvency problem is the explicit separation between
managers and depositors. By study a version of this banking model in which
managers do not have the same objective as the depositors the moral hazard
considerations mentioned above could be seriously addressed. That is, moral
hazard considerations are to be studied in settings where those objectives are
discordant, since it is obvious that when they are the same hidden action problems
cannot arise. There are several alternatives for modelling this. There is a vast
literature on incomplete contracts in banking (see Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993
and 1994). Chang and Velasco (1998a) also present a model in which the banking
sector is monopolistic. Any of these frameworks could be helpful to study moral
hazard and lenders of last resort. Finally, issues on insurance schemes (in the
spirit of Druck, 2000, for example) can also be considered in the international
setting.
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A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Proposition 4.1
Given that the utility function is strictly concave and the constraints are linear,
the …rst order conditions are necessary and su¢cient to characterize the optimal
allocation. Those conditions are the following:
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] = Á0 (A.1)
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] 5 Á0 (A.2)
Á1 (s) 5 Á2 (s) (A.3)
u0
¡
c11
¢
= Á1 (1) + Á1 (2) (A.4)
q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)
¢
= Á1 (1) (A.5)
qsu
0 (c2 (s)) = Á2 (s) (A.6)
v0 (m2 (s)) = 0 (A.7)
The …rst four expressions correspond to the …rst derivative of the Lagrangian with
respect to x; y; z (1) and z (2) respectively. The last four equalities are the …rst
derivatives with respect to c11; c
2
1 (1) ; c
1
2 (1), c2 (s) and m2 (s) : This last equality
implies that m2 (s) = ¹ for all s:
I …rst show that y¤ = 0: Using contradiction, assume that y¤ > 0: Then from
A.1 and A.2 we have
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] = R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)]
> [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)]
On the other hand, we have
Á1 (s) 5 Á2 (s)
for every s; and therefore
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] 5 [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)]
a contradiction. Hence y¤ = 0:
Then this implies that Á1 (s) = Á2 (s) for s = 1; 2: From the expressions ??,
A.7 and A.4 we get
u0
¡
c21 (1)
¢
= u0 (c2 (1))
u0
¡
c11
¢
= q1u
0 ¡c12 (1)
¢
+ q2u
0 (c2 (2))
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Obviously, from the …rst equation we get c21 (1) = c
1
2 (1) : On thee other hand,
from the constraints (holding with strict equality)
p®c11 + (1¡ p) c21 (1) = z (1)
p®c11 = z (2)
p (1¡ ®) c12 (1) +
¡
¹d+ z (1)
¢
= R ¹d
p (1¡ ®) c12 (2) + (1¡ p) c22 (2) +
¡
¹d+ z (2)
¢
= R ¹d
implies that
p (1¡ ®) c12 (1) + p®c11 + (1¡ p) c21 (1)
= (R ¡ 1) ¹d
= [p (1¡ ®) + (1¡ p)] c2 (2) + p®c11
and therefore
p (1¡ ®) c12 (1) + (1¡ p) c21 (1) = [p (1¡ ®) + (1¡ p)] c22 (2)
But c21 (1) = c
1
2 (1). This implies that c
2
1 (1) = c
1
2 (1) = c
2
2 (2) ´ ¹c: But then, from
u0
¡
c11
¢
= q1u
0 ¡c12 (1)
¢
+ q2u
0 (c2 (2))
we get that c11 = ¹c; showing that perfect risk sharing is the only solution to the
planner’s problem.
Then, from the constraint
p (1¡ ®) c12 (2) + (1¡ p) c22 (2) +
¡
¹d+ z (2)
¢
= R ¹d
we have that
[p (1¡ ®) + (1¡ p)] ¹c+ z (2) = (R ¡ 1) ¹d
But
z (2) = p®¹c
so that
[p (1¡ ®) + (1¡ p)] ¹c+ p®¹c = (R ¡ 1) ¹d
and then
¹c = (R ¡ 1) ¹d
This ends the proof.
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A.2. Proof of Proposition 4.2
Ignoring the incentive compatibility constraints for a moment, the …rst order
conditions of the commercial bank problem are as before.
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] = Á0 (A.8)
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] 5 Á0 (A.9)
Á1 (s) 5 Á2 (s) (A.10)
u0
¡
c11
¢
= Á1 (1) + Á1 (2) (A.11)
q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)
¢
= Á1 (1) (A.12)
q2u
0 ¡cj2 (s)
¢
= Á2 (s) ; j = 1; 2 (A.13)
v0
¡
m12
¢
=
2X
s=1
(Á1 (s)¡ Á2 (s)) (A.14)
q2v
0 ¡m22 (2)
¢
= Á1 (2)¡ Á2 (2) (A.15)
These are the same …rst order conditions as above with the addition of the last
equation. Now, by the same arguments as before, y¤ = 0 and so Á1 (s) = Á2 (s) ;
since z (s) > 0 for s = 1; 2: But then v0 (m12) = v
0 (m22 (2)) = 0, so m
1
2 = m2 (2) =
¹. On the other hand, it is clear that c12 (2) = c
2
2 (2) ´ c2 (2) : Therefore, the …rst
order conditions of the optimal allocation arise. Therefore the currency board
allocation is the optimal allocation, since this allocation satis…es with equality
the incentive compatibility constraint. This ends the proof:
A.3. Proof of Proposition 5.1
First, it is clear that the optimal amount of local currency is again ¹; since the
cost of printing pesos is always zero. Next, the necessary and su¢cient …rst-
order conditions with respect of x; y and z (s) of the second best problem are the
following.
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] = Á0 (A.16)
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] 5 Á0 (A.17)
Á1 (s) 5 Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) (A.18)
where ¿ (s) is the multiplier of the constraint d+z (s) 5 ¹d: The FOC corresponding
to the consumption allocations are as follows.
u0
¡
c11
¢
= Á1 (1) + Á1 (2) (A.19)
q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)
¢
= Á1 (1) (A.20)
qsu
0 (c2 (s)) = Á2 (s) (A.21)
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Finally, the FOC with respect to d is
Á0 =
2X
s=1
¿ (s) +
2X
s=1
Á2 (s) (A.22)
This condition must hold since it must be the case that d > 0: Otherwise x = 0 but
then consumption of patient agents is always zero. Since the objective function
is strictly concave, the solution to be characterized must be unique. I show now
that this equilibrium is characterized by z (1) > 0; z (2) ¸ 0 and y ¸ 0: Under
these conditions it must be the case that
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] = Á0 (A.23)
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] 5 Á0 (A.24)
Á1 (s) 5 Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) (A.25)
Á0 =
2X
s=1
¿ (s) +
2X
s=1
Á2 (s) (A.26)
and so
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] =
2X
s=1
¿ (s) +
2X
s=1
Á2 (s) (A.27)
This implies
2X
s=1
¿ (s) = (R¡ 1) [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] > 0 (A.28)
which means that for at least one s; ¿ (s) > 0: On the other hand it must be the
case that
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] = [Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] (A.29)
This is because either y > 0; or, if this is zero, then it must be the case that
z (s) > 0 for s = 1; 2: In both cases we arrive to this last equality. Hence we have:
u0
¡
c11
¢
= R [q1u
0 (c2 (1)) + q2u0 (c2 (2))] (A.30)
On the other hand we have that if z (1) > 0; then
q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)
¢
= q1u
0 ¡c22 (1)
¢
+ ¿ (1) (A.31)
¸ q1u0
¡
c22 (1)
¢
which implies c21 (1) 5 c22 (1) : Also, from the date 1 and 2 budget constraints:
p (1¡ ®) c2 (1) + (1¡ p) c21 (1) = [p (1¡ ®) + (1¡ p)] c2 (2) (A.32)
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since they hold with equality. Therefore it must be the case that
c21 (1) 5 c2 (2) 5 c22 (1) (A.33)
However, the fact that the date 1 budget constraints hold with equality implies
z (1) = (1¡ p) c21 (1) + z (2) (A.34)
but so z (1) > z (2) : On the other hand, it is clear that
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] =
2X
s=1
¿ (s) +
2X
s=1
Á2 (s) = [Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)]
Á1 (s) 5 Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) ; s = 1; 2
But the …rst two equalities imply that for each s, Á1 (s) = Á2 (s)+ ¿ (s) : Suppose,
instead, that for some s; Á1 (s) < Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) : Then, summing over s we have
[Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] <
P2
s=1 ¿ (s)+
P2
s=1 Á2 (s) ; which contradicts the second equality
on the …rst line. Hence it must happen that Á1 (s) = Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) for every s:
On the other hand, since z (1) > z (2) ; clearly it is true that z (1) > 0: Therefore
it must be the case that ¿ (1) > 0: If this were not the case, then ¿ (2) should be
positive, since for at least one s; ¿ (s) > 0: But then z (2) + d = ¹d; but then z (1)
+ d > ¹d; violating the constraint. Therefore ¿ (1) > 0 and so z (1) + d = ¹d: But
then z (2) + d < ¹d and so ¿ (2) = 0: This implies that:
u0
¡
c11
¢
= [Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)] (A.35)
= q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)
¢
+ Á1 (2)
= q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)
¢
+ Á2 (2)
= q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)
¢
+ q2u
0 (c2 (2))
and so
q1
£
u0
¡
c11
¢¡ u0 ¡c21 (1)
¢¤
= q2
£
u0 (c2 (2))¡ u0
¡
c11
¢¤
(A.36)
meaning that
sgn
£
c11 ¡ c21 (1)
¤
= sgn
£
c2 (2)¡ c11
¤
(A.37)
I show now that sgn [c11 ¡ c21 (1)] > 0; which proves partial suspension of convert-
ibility. Suppose that this is not the case, that is, sgn [c11 ¡ c21 (1)] < 0: Then c2 (2)
< c11: But then c2 (2) < c
2
1 (1) ; contradicting the statement above. Therefore it
must be that c11 ¸ c21 (1) : However, if c11 = c21 (1) then it must be true that
c11 = c
2
1 (1) = c2 (1) = c2 (2) (A.38)
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But this implies that q1u0 (c21 (1)) = q1u
0 (c22 (1)) : But then, from
q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)
¢
= q1u
0 ¡c22 (1)
¢
+ ¿ (1) (A.39)
then ¿ (1) = 0; contradicting the result above. This implies that c11 > c
2
1 (1)
showing that partial suspension of convertibility of deposits must hold. This
also implies that c2 (2) > c11; showing that the optimal allocation is incentive
compatible. This ends the proof of this proposition.
A.4. Proof of proposition 5.2
The problem of a currency board system with limited credit is to maximize the
expected utility function 4.6 subject to the constraints
d+ z (s) 5 ¹d
x+ y 5 d
p®c11 + p (1¡ ®)m12 + (1¡ p) c21 (1) 5 z (1) + y
p®c11 + p (1¡ ®)m12 + (1¡ p)m22 (2) 5 z (2) + y
p (1¡ ®) c12 (1) 5 p (1¡ ®)m12 +Rx¡ z (1)¡ d
p (1¡ ®) c12 (2) + (1¡ p) c22 (2) 5 p (1¡ ®)m12 + (1¡ p)m22 (2)
+Rx¡ z (2)¡ d
The …rst order conditions with respect to d; x, y and z (s) are as in the second best
program. The same is true with respect to the …rst derivatives of the Lagrangian
with respect to c11; c
2
1 (1) ; m
1
2 and c
2
2 (2) : The …rst order conditions with respect
to pesos are the following
v0
¡
m12
¢
=
2X
s=1
(Á1 (s)¡ Á2 (s))
q2v
0 ¡m22 (2)
¢
= Á1 (2)¡ Á2 (2)
The arguments in the proof of the proposition (5:1) presented above shows that
¿ (1) > ¿ (2) = 0: On the other hand, the same proof shows that Á1 (s) =
Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) for every s: So we obtain that v
0 (m12) =
P2
s=1 ¿ (s) = ¿ (1) > 0
and q2v0 (m22 (2)) = ¿ (2) = 0: Therefore, even though this last equality implies
m22 (2) = ¹; however the …rst implies thatm
1
2 < ¹: Hence, a banking system within
currency board regime cannot implement the second best allocation.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 5.3
Ignoring the incentive compatibility constraints, the problem can be written as
the maximization of
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p®u
¡
c11
¢
+ q1
£
(1¡ p)u ¡c21 (1)
¢
+ p (1¡ ®) ¡u ¡c12 (1)
¢
+ v
¡
m12
¢¢¤
(A.40)
+q2
£
p (1¡ ®) ¡u ¡c12 (2)
¢
+ v
¡
m12
¢¢
+ (1¡ p) ¡u ¡c22 (2)
¢
+ v
¡
m22 (2)
¢¢¤
subject to
x+ y 5 d (A.41)
p®c11 + p (1¡ ®)m12 + (1¡ p) c21 (1) 5 z (1) + y + h1 (A.42)
p®c11 + p (1¡ ®)m12 + (1¡ p)m22 (2) 5 z (2) + y + h2 (A.43)
p®c11 + (1¡ p) c21 (1) 5 z (1) + y (A.44)
p®c11 5 z (2) + y (A.45)
p (1¡ ®) c2 (1) 5 p (1¡ ®)m12 ¡ h1 +Rx¡ d¡ z (1) (A.46)
p (1¡ ®) c12 (2) + (1¡ p) c22 (2) 5 p (1¡ ®)m12 + (1¡ p)m22 (2) (A.47)
+Rx¡ d¡ z (2)¡ h2 (A.48)
d+ z (s) 5 ¹d (A.49)
where the inequalities (A:44) and (A:45) are imposed so that banks cannot …nance
date 1 consumption of dollars entirely with pesos issued by the Central Bank
(this is similar to Chang and Velasco, 2000). Let ´ (s) be the multiplier of each
constraint. The …rst order conditions with respect to x; y, z (s), hs and d are as
follows.
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] = Á0 (A.50)
2X
s=1
[Á1 (s) + ´ (s)] 5 Á0 (A.51)
Á1 (s) + ´ (s) 5 Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) (A.52)
Á1 (s) 5 Á2 (s) (A.53)
Á0 =
X
s
[Á2 (s) + ¿ (s)]
First, I consider an equilibrium where hs > 0 for both s: Hence, we must have
Á1 (s) = Á2 (s) : On the other hand, this implies then that ´ (s) 5 ¿ (s) for every s:
If y = 0 then z (s) > 0 for both s and therefore ´ (s) = ¿ (s)). If y > 0 then Á0 =P
s [Á1 (s) + ´ (s)] = R [
P
s Á2 (s)] =
P
s [Á2 (s) + ¿ (s)] : Hence this implies thatP
s ¿ (s) =
P
s ´ (s). But then since ´ (s) 5 ¿ (s) for every s; it must be true in fact
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that ´ (s) = ¿ (s) for every s: But then, since R [
P
s Á2 (s)] =
P
s [Á2 (s) + ¿ (s)]
and R > 1; again we have that at least for some s; ¿ (s) = ´ (s) > 0: It must be
shown for which s this is true.
The rest of the …rst order conditions are as follows.
u0
¡
c11
¢
=
X
s
[Á1 (s) + ´ (s)] (A.54)
q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)
¢
= Á1 (1) + ´ (1) (A.55)
qsu
0 ¡cj2 (s)
¢
= Á2 (s) ; j = 1; 2; s = 1; 2 (A.56)
v0
¡
m12
¢
=
2X
s=1
(Á1 (s)¡ Á2 (s)) = 0 (A.57)
q2v
0 ¡m22 (2)
¢
= Á1 (2)¡ Á2 (2) = 0 (A.58)
Therefore it must happen that m12 = m
2
2 (2) = ¹: On the other hand, we again
have
u0
¡
c11
¢
= q1u
0 ¡c21 (1)
¢
+ [Á1 (2) + ´ (2)]
On the other hand, it is easy show that the constraints (A:44) and (A:45) must
hold with equality. If this were not true, then it is possible to increase the con-
sumption of dollars for all consumer types (the details are left to the reader).
Therefore, the solution to this problem satis…es exactly the same constraints of
the planner’s second best problem. Also this shows that h1 = p (1¡ ®) ¹ and h2
= (p (1¡ ®) + 1¡ p)¹: Then, this again implies that z (1) = z (2) + (1¡ p) c21 (1)
and so z (1) > z (2) : If this holds and if at least for some s; ¿ (s) > 0; then it must
be true that ¿ (1) > ¿ (2) = 0; following the same arguments as in the proof of
proposition 5.1. Therefore ´ (2) = ¿ (2) = 0: But then we have that u0 (c11) = q1
u0 (c21 (1)) + Á1 (2) = q1 u
0 (c21 (1)) + Á2 (2) = q1 u
0 (c21 (1)) + q2 u
0 (c2 (2)) : Also it
must happen that
P
s [Á1 (s) + ´ (s)] = R [
P
s Á2 (s)] ; which is the same as u
0 (c11)
= R [
P
s qsu
0 (c2 (s))] : Thus, the solution to this problem also satis…es the same
…rst order conditions as in proposition 5.1. Hence, this solution must coincide
with that of proposition 5.1.
A.6. Proof of proposition 5.4
The condition
r < R
µ
c21 (1)
c2 (1)
¶
(A.59)
30
is equivalent to r < p(1¡®)c
2
1(1)³
p(1¡®)c2(1)
R
´ , which is true if and only if
r <
p (1¡ ®) c21 (1)³
p(1¡®)c2(1)+ ¹d¡ ¹d
R
´ (A.60)
However, the second best implies that ¹d = z (1) + d, so
r <
p (1¡ ®) c21 (1)³
p(1¡®)c2(1)+(z(1)+d)¡(z(1)+d)
R
´ (A.61)
and also at the solution of the second best problem we had that Rx ¡ d ¡ z (1)
= p (1¡ ®) c2 (1) ; so that the last inequality is equivalent to
r
µ
x¡ z (1) + d
R
¶
< p (1¡ ®) c21 (1) (A.62)
Suppose all patient consumers believe that the others withdraw from the com-
mercial banks at date 1. The intermediaries pay c11 to the …rst ®p and c
2
1 (1)
consumers, …nancing both by borrowing z (1) dollars from abroad and or with
the total amount of short run investment y (if this is positive). Note again that
although the true state may be s = 2; if ®p + 1 ¡ p agents show up then the
commercial bank thinks that the true state is s = 1: If more consumers show
up the intermediaries must still pay c21 (1)pesos to each one, which will be ex-
changed for dollars at the Central Bank. But the amount of resources left is equal
to r
³
¹x¡ d+z(1)
R
´
: This happens because the intermediary liquidates
³
¹x¡ d+z(1)
R
´
units of the long term investment at date 1 in order to satisfy withdrawals. Since
this is strictly less than payments needed to be done if all the rest of agents
withdraw then the bank fails (in the sense that not all consumers are satis…ed,
although debt at date 2 is perfectly honored).
All agents know that this happens if everybody runs against the bank. Then
if every individual consumer thinks that the rest of the population runs, then it
is optimal to withdraw early. This is because the expected utility of withdrawing
early is strictly greater than u (0) + v (0) : But then in this case the commercial
bank fails.
Suppose that the opposite inequality holds. I show now that there is no run.
Suppose then that
r ¸ R
µ
c21 (1)
c2 (1)
¶
(A.63)
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Therefore, by the same argument as before,
r
µ
x¡ z (1) + d
R
¶
¸ p (1¡ ®) c21 (1) (A.64)
Consider now the following situation. Suppose that a total measure of p® +
1 ¡ p + b¼ consumers try to withdraw from commercial banks at date 1; with
b¼ < p (1¡ ®) : Again the …rst p® consumers get c11 while the rest of agents get
c21 (1) : In order to satisfy withdrawals by b¼ consumers commercial banks must
liquidate a portion of the long term investment. Let bl be the total liquidation of
this investment. This must satisfy
bl = b¼c
2
1 (1)
r
(A.65)
In period 2 total per-capita resources are given by:
Rx¡ ¹d¡Rbl (A.66)
= p (1¡ ®) c2 (1)¡Rb¼c
2
1 (1)
r
But since r ¸ R
³
c21(1)
c2(1)
´
; then R
r
c21 (1) 5 c2 (1) and therefore
p (1¡ ®) c2 (1)¡Rb¼c
2
1 (1)
r
¸ p (1¡ ®) c2 (1)¡ b¼c2 (1) (A.67)
= [p (1¡ ®)¡ b¼] c2 (1)
This means that commercial banks have enough resources so that patient con-
sumers waiting until period 2 consume c2 (1) dollars and ¹ pesos. Hence banks
do not fail and patient consumers do not …nd optimal to run. This is because, by
running they get at most c11 dollars (if included …rst in line) that can be stored
until til period 2: Since they are patient consumers, they consume a null amount
of local currency. Hence each patient consumer is strictly better o¤ by waiting
until date 2: This concludes the proof.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 5.5
If the interest rate is equal to ½ then the amount of dollars available at date 2 is
Rx¡ ¡ ¹d + z (1)¢¡ ½¼^c21 (1) (A.68)
Replacing in x and z (1) using the constraints of the second best problem, it can
be shown that this last expression is equal to
p (1¡ ®) c2 (1)¡ ½¼^c21 (1) (A.69)
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Since ½ 5 c2 (1) = c21 (1) then the last expression is at least equal to c2 (1) ¸ c21 (1) :
This implies again that for any patient consumer it is best to wait until period 2.
This ends the proof.
A.8. Proof of proposition 6.1
Clearly, it must be the case that m2 (s) = e2 (s) = ¹ since printing pesos is free
for the planner. The …rst order conditions that characterizes the optimal dollar
consumption in this case are the following.
q (s)u0 (ct (s)) = Át (s)
with t = 1; 2; and s = 1; 2;
Á0 = R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)]
Á0 =
2X
s=1
(Á2 (s) + ¿ (s))
Á1 (1) + Á1 (2) 5 Á0
Á1 (s) 5 Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) ; s = 1; 2
where the …rst expression is the …rst derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to
ct (s) ; the second two equalities are the derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect
to x and d (both should be positive to ensure that c2 (s) > 0) and the two weak
inequalities are the …rst derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to y and z (s)
respectively. It is clear again that either y > 0 or, if y = 0; then z (s) > 0 for
both s: Therefore
R [Á2 (1) + Á2 (2)] =
2X
s=1
(Á2 (s) + ¿ (s)) = Á1 (1) + Á1 (2)
This implies that Á1 (s) = Á2 (s) + ¿ (s) for each s: Otherwise the second equality
would be violated. The …rst equality implies that at least for some s; ¿ (s) > 0;
since R > 1: Therefore, for both s; u0 (c2 (s)) 5 u0 (c1 (s)) ; with at least for some
s; the inequality is strict. Hence it is true that c2 (s) ¸ c1 (s) for both s; and
with strict inequality for at least one s: Hence the optimal solution is incentive
compatible for patient consumers.
To show that this allocation is better from the ex-ante point of view for agents,
consider the following. Take the optimal consumption allocation from the plan-
ner’s problem in section 5. Consider the following alternative consumption allo-
cation
bc1 (1) ´
µ
p®
p® + 1¡ p
¶
c11 +
µ
1¡ p
p® + 1¡ p
¶
c21 (1)
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bc1 (2) ´ c11
bc2 (s) ´ c2 (s)
It is clear that the hat allocation, together with the investment and borrowing
plan (x; y; d; z (1) ; z (2)) from the solution satisfy all constraints. This is because
[p® + 1¡ p]bc1 (1)
= [p® + 1¡ p]
?µ
p®
p®+ 1¡ p
¶
c11 +
µ
1¡ p
p®+ 1¡ p
¶
c21 (1)
¸
= p®c11 + (1¡ p) c12 (1)
= y + z (1)
and clearly, bc1 (2) and bc2 (s) also satisfy the other constraints by construction.
However, this hat allocation gives a strictly higher ex-ante utility. This is because
of the following. Original preferences are represented by equation (3:1). Given
that the solution implies that m2(s)
e2(s)
= ¹ for all s; then the relevant part of the
utility function (the part that only includes utility for dollars) can be written as
q1
£
p®u
¡
c11
¢
+ (1¡ p) u ¡c21 (1)
¢
+ p (1¡ ®)u (c2 (1))
¤
+q2
£
p®u
¡
c11
¢
+ (p (1¡ ®) + 1¡ p)u (c2 (2))
¤
But since u is strictly concave
u (bc1 (1)) >
µ
p®
p®+ 1¡ p
¶
u
¡
c11
¢
+
µ
1¡ p
p®+ 1¡ p
¶
u
¡
c21 (1)
¢
and hence
p®u
¡
c11
¢
+ (1¡ p)u ¡c21 (1)
¢
< [p®+ 1¡ p] u (bc1 (1))
Therefore ex-ante utility under the hat allocation is strictly higher than under the
optimal solution with non public revelation of s (solution of the planner’s problem
of section 5). Therefore the solution to the planner’s problem in section 6 must
yield a strictly higher utility than the solution to the planner’s problem in section
5. This ends the proof.
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